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Italy and Spain are two countries with very rigid labor markets, as
defined by various indicators, such as direct firing costs, procedural
restrictions to workforce adjustment, and other employment protection
features (see, e.g., Grubb and Welles 1993; Barnard, Clark, and Lewis
1995; OECD 1999). They also share the “Mediterranean” lifestyle,
with its extended families and low female work participation rates, as
well as significant regional differences between the more developed
northern regions and the more underdeveloped southern ones (although
this duality is more striking in Italy). These two countries have also
recently undergone deregulation, although to varying degrees and tim-
ing (for an earlier analysis, see Adam and Canziani 1998). In both
countries, the pressing force for changes has been unemployment. It is
doubtful, however, that this deregulation has ameliorated unemploy-
ment problems in these countries. Rather, dual labor market structures
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have tended to develop, most notably in Spain, although it is unclear
that what drives their current stability is institutional. 
The purpose of this chapter is to compare the development of
“nonstandard” work in Italy and Spain. Section 2 describes the main
features of the Italian and Spanish labor markets. Section 3 discusses
the notion of nonstandard work, while section 4 briefly describes the
move toward nonstandard work in both countries. Section 5 begins the
empirical part of the chapter by quantifying the size and evolution of
nonstandard work, and section 6 analyzes the key characteristics of the
main groups of nonstandard workers. Section 7 turns to the welfare of
these workers, in terms of income, poverty, and job satisfaction.
Finally, section 8 reflects on the role of nonstandard work as a weapon
against unemployment.
BASIC FEATURES OF THE ITALIAN 
AND SPANISH LABOR MARKETS
Figure 4.1 plots the evolution of employment in Italy and Spain
since 19771 (all numbers are expressed as indices of the 1977 labor
force to facilitate the comparisons). Labor force participation increased
by 14 percent between 1977 and 2000 in Italy, and by 20 percent in
Spain, with the main divergence between the two countries occurring
in the 1990s. This faster growth in Spain, however, is deceptive, given
the greater unemployment in Spain depicted in Figure 4.2. Of more
importance is the way in which employment evolved in both countries.
Thus, while in Italy, employment has increased more or less steadily
(although it suffered a crisis in the early 1990s), in Spain, employment
has experienced significant shifts. The first shift was a sharp downturn
between 1977 and 1985, which reflects an adjustment from a pre-
democratic, autarchic economy to the new competition within the
European community. The second shift (1985–1991) occurred when
the economy recovered at an unprecedented pace, helped by various
factors, including entry into the European Union, lower oil prices, high
profits achieved in the previous recession, and labor market reform that
eased the use of fixed-term contracts. In the early 1990s, the European-
wide crisis also affected Spain significantly. Finally, since 1994, and
Nonstandard Work in Italy and Spain 91
more strongly since 1997, employment in Spain rose again at very high
rates. Therefore, although in relative terms, employment has always
been lower in Spain than in Italy throughout the period considered, by
1999, the two countries had reached similar levels.
Figure 4.2 plots unemployment, the flip side of Figure 4.1.
Although the story in Italy is one of a slowly rising unemployment,
driven by the inability of employment to expand as fast as the labor
supply, in Spain, the labor supply has tended to be absorbed by the
strong employment surges of the late 1980s and late 1990s. Thus,
while unemployment in Spain was twice as great as in Italy in 1985
and again in 1994, the unemployment and employment data in the two
figures both tend to converge in the 1990s.
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 also include the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) projected evolution of labor
force, which sees employment and unemployment rising until 2001.
This is of interest for two reasons. First, the data more clearly reveal
Figure 4.1 Employment and the Labor Force in Italy and Spain, 
1977–2001
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the process of employment recovery that has begun in Italy, suggesting
an upsurge for the first time in ten years, similar to that observed in
1989–1991. Second, they pinpoint the strength of the Spanish employ-
ment growth, which despite the continuing rise in labor supply drives
down unemployment to 13 percent, thus getting closer to Italy.
It is also worth considering the degree of labor mobility in both
countries, given that this is an important element of labor market insta-
bility. Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of male and female employees
in Italy and Spain in 1992, 1995, and 2000 by tenure in their current
job.2 The Spanish labor market has substantially higher mobility. In
1992 and 1995, the proportion of those with job tenure less than a year
was more than 20 percent.3 In Italy, it was roughly 5 percent in 1991
and 1994. The gap narrowed between the two countries in 2000, but
Spain continued to have more workers with short tenures. 
Figure 4.2 Unemployment Rate in Italy and Spain, 1977–2001 (% of 
labor force)
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INSTITUTIONAL DEFINITIONS OF STANDARD 
WORK ARRANGEMENTS 
Before moving on to the analysis of nonstandard work in the two
countries, it is useful to analyze how standard work is defined. As in
most countries, the “standard” work arrangement in Italy and Spain is a
dependent, full-time, permanent (or “open-ended”) labor contract.
Appendix A details the regulation of labor contracts in both countries.
In Italy, the standard contract was progressively expanded during
the twentieth century with trade union action, the development of large
industrial firms, and the rise of the welfare state. Both the 1947 Italian
Constitution and the 1970 Workers’ Statute provide special rights only
to permanent employees, then considered the weakest segment of over-
all employment in terms of social protection and working conditions.
During the 1970s, both labor legislation and collective bargaining
Figure 4.3 Distribution of Employed Population by Tenure with the 
Current Employer, Spain and Italy, 1992, 1995, and 2000
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focused specifically on “job security” (workplace stability), considered
a public good under the “male bread-winner model” (Fagan and
Rubery 1996), which characterizes the Italian social system. This polit-
ical and social strategy led to a fairly strict limitation of employers’
power and practices, especially concerning firing and hiring in large
firms, and provided several measures of employment protection. From
a legislative and contractual point of view, “job security” became much
more relevant than in the past.
More specifically, individual dismissals had to be justified, either
as misconduct by the employee or an objective reason relating to the
enterprise (Boeri 1997; Samek Lodovici 2000). An employee can chal-
lenge a dismissal by filing a written statement within 60 days. The case
is heard by a special judge (pretore del lavoro) who decides whether
the employer has demonstrated a justified motive. If the judge rules
against the employer, the dismissal is void and the employer must com-
pensate the worker for damage and reinstate him or her.4
In addition, standard workers also enjoy greater access to fringe
benefits and unemployment benefits, although these tend to be more
related to tenure than to the contract itself. For example, access to
mobility benefits,5 which are much more generous than unemployment
benefits, requires two years of consecutive employment. Needless to
say, self-employed workers are ineligible for any form of unemploy-
ment insurance and benefits (Dell’Aringa and Samek Lodovici 1997).
In Spain, 40 years of political dictatorship, with fairly paternalistic
labor laws and rigid employment regulations (compensated for by a
highly flexible wage system), was followed by a short experience of
democracy in the late 1970s with sharp economic turmoil6 and down-
turns. On the heels of this period, the 1980 Workers’ Statute created
the main labor market regulations that currently exist and clearly estab-
lished a preference for the open-ended contract as the “normal” labor
contract.7 Dismissals were severely restricted, and in many instances
required prior administrative approval. Economic difficulties, for
example, were not considered a fair cause for individual dismissal.8
Nevertheless, the new regulations made it possible for firms to fire at
will, provided they resorted to a more expensive, but easier and more
certain, unfair dismissal procedure.9 The situation changed in 1994,
when the dismissal procedures were eased somewhat,10 and again in
1997 when a special open-ended contract, with somewhat lower sever-
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ance pay, was introduced. On the whole, however, it is still fair to say
that employers can fire Spanish employees with an open-ended con-
tract at will, but with a cost, which is generally deemed “high” by
European standards.11
Other benefits, for example fringe benefits or unemployment
insurance, are related more to seniority than to the contract itself.
Needless to say, nonstandard dependent workers are bound to experi-
ence shorter employment spells and hence to have less access to those
benefits, to the extent that these are not vested (which they are in many
instances, especially when publicly provided); however, this lack of
access is fundamentally unrelated to their contract status. For example,
workers under fixed-term contracts in Spain may, on the surface, have
no access to unemployment benefits. However, if they work six
months under six different one-month contracts for six different
employers, they will become eligible for benefits, regardless of
whether the six months of work were consecutive or interspersed with
spells of unemployment. 
Thus, both in Italy and Spain, standard workers enjoy substantial
protection from arbitrary action by firms. By most international com-
parisons (albeit with the inherent difficulties in such comparisons), the
two countries rank high in terms of legal employment protection. This
is the most significant difference, and it is against this that the situation
of nonstandard workers must be judged.
THE MOVE TOWARD NONSTANDARD WORK
Despite the preference for standard work arrangements in both
Italy and Spain, both countries, urged on by unemployment, have tried
to circumvent the rigidities in open-ended labor contracts. In both
cases, the changes have not attempted to alter the nature of the core
labor market, but rather have aimed at creating fringes in the labor mar-
ket with less restrictive hiring and firing conditions. One of the early
responses of the economy to the initial restrictive regulation was a
flourishing underground economy and independent work, especially in
Italy, and one of the side effects of the move toward nonstandard work
has been the emergence of such activities, especially in Spain.
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In Italy, the strict regulation of the labor market has been undergo-
ing a transformation for some years (De Luca and Bruni 1993; Paci
1998). It is not an overall coherent reform, but rather, a series of incre-
mental interventions and decrees that have modified the system as a
whole. One of the most important changes in Italy in recent years is the
diversification of employment contracts, leading to an expansion of
temporary employment (including seasonal employment contracts,
youth work-training, and apprenticeship contracts) and of “indepen-
dent contractors,” those workers midway between dependent and inde-
pendent work, and defined in the sociological literature as “second
generation” self-employment (Bologna and Fumagalli 1997). 
In recent years, this new form of self-employment (including
freelance work, independent contractors,12 “co-workers,” etc.) has
increased rapidly, especially in northern Italy and in certain sectors
(Semenza 2000). Much of the flexibility provided by work relations
that depart from the standard model in Italy is to be attributed to these
middle positions between wage work and self-employment. These new
forms of employment are the result of both outsourcing on the demand
side and a different way of conceiving work on the supply side, where
work choices may be functionally linked to the workers’ life cycle
(Bassanini and Donati 2001). Recent reforms, although with stricter
eligibility rules, are substantially changing the working status of the
new independent workers (e.g., they receive the same tax treatment as
the dependent workers, a gradual increase of the pension contributions
rate, and extension of some social assistance benefits such as coverage
for hospitalization, family allowances, maternity leave). Although for
dependent, nonstandard workers, there is a mild shift toward less regu-
lation, the opposite is true for independent contractors. For this group,
greater regulation offers some employment protection. 
Dependent work has seen changes as well, although none are radi-
cal departures from recent policies. Changes have included the intro-
duction of mobility procedures and benefits in collective layoffs; the
abolition of the obligation to employ from official employment office
waiting lists (1991); the introduction of various youth temporary
employment contracts and the relaunching of apprenticeship schemes
(1984, 1997); new rules and incentives for fixed-term and part-time
work (1997, 2000); the introduction of temporary agency employment
and the end of the public monopoly on job placement (1997); the intro-
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duction of “graduality contracts” between companies and unions to
encourage undeclared and irregular work;13 and the decentralization of
employment services at the local level (1997). An important element
also introduced in 1997 (in the Treu package) was the substitution of a
monetary penalty for automatically converting fixed-term workers into
permanent ones when work extended (up to 30 days) beyond the offi-
cial expiry date with the possibility to renew the contract once. 
In Spain, the 1980 Workers’ Statute left the door open to excep-
tions to the normal, open-ended labor contract. These were established
for clearly temporary activities, for which temporary contracts were
allowed, as well as for initial contracts for youth (accepting what was
already set up since 1978). In addition, the law allowed government to
introduce other instances for using temporary contracts, even for per-
forming the normal activities of firms (which would break the so-
called “causality principle” for temporary hiring), as an “employment
promotion measure.” This possibility was used for the first time in
1982, although the new contract was subject to various restrictions.
The situation changed quite dramatically when the Socialist govern-
ment, elected in late 1982, reformed the Workers’ Statute in 1984 by
expanding the possibilities for using temporary contracts (mostly
through the so-called “new line of business” contract) as well as main-
taining the noncausal, fixed-term contract as a measure of employment
promotion. This latter measure was made permanent, whereas in the
past, it was removed when the employment situation improved.14 In
principle, the 1984 reform established two types of contracts: tempo-
rary contracts, to be used for temporary tasks, and fixed-term contracts,
which could also be used to perform the “normal” activities of firms.
This amendment to the Workers’ Statute, which also included other
measures such as the regulation of part-time work, has been the corner-
stone of labor market reform in Spain in the last 20 years (see, e.g.,
Malo and Toharia 2000). 
Further reforms were introduced throughout the 1990s. In 1992,
the fixed-term contract was restricted and unemployment benefits cur-
tailed, and then again in 1994, amid a wholesale refurbishing of the
statute, further efforts were made to foster part-time work, and the
fixed-term contract was further restricted (limiting its use to specific
groups). In 1995, temporary help agencies were legalized, and the
monopoly of the public employment services was suspended. In 1997,
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the fixed-term contract was altogether abolished, and a new open-
ended contract was introduced. In 1998, part-time work was again
reformed, and finally, in 2001, the 1998 reform of the part-time con-
tract was reversed (in a move to make it more flexible), and the cover-
age of the new open-ended contract was expanded. These changes
throughout the 1990s did not reduce the number of contracts signed; in
fact, they increased. Firms, forced to move away from fixed-term con-
tracts (as they were simply being eliminated), resorted to temporary
contracts, thus somewhat paradoxically gaining flexibility given that
the temporary contracts were less regulated and allowed much more
flexible time spans.
Thus, in Italy, moves toward dependent, nonstandard work have
been much milder than in Spain and have been introduced just recently
(Samek Lodovici and Semenza 2001). For example, fixed-term work
has been restricted to clearly temporary tasks and to youth labor market
integration policies, and part-time work has been regulated based on
the proportionality principle. The flip side of the situation is the growth
of very flexible independent contractors, for whom some regulation
has been introduced in recent years. The impression is that further
moves could be undertaken should the labor market situation worsen in
the next few years (something that at present does not seem plausible,
at least in the short term). In Spain, on the other hand, the situation is
inverse. Social agents believe that the move toward nonstandard work,
especially regarding temporary or fixed-term work, has gone too far.
However, the successive measures adopted to reduce the extent of tem-
porary work (most notably in 1997 )15 have met with failure generally,
and the issue remains alive. 
QUANTIFYING NONSTANDARD WORK 
IN ITALY AND SPAIN
We now present data on nonstandard work arrangements in Italy
and Spain. The data come mainly from the European Community
Household Panel (ECHP) and correspond to 1996.16 This source offers
the ability to make comparisons across categories, defined on a com-
mon statistical basis, and will also be the source for the welfare analysis
below. 
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Table 4.1 presents data for the following categories: full-time per-
manent employees; part-time permanent employees; full-time tempo-
rary employees; part-time temporary employees; paid apprentices and
trainees under special schemes; self-employed; and unpaid family
workers.
It could be argued that all but full-time permanent employees rep-
resent the extent of nonstandard work, given that they depart from the
standard defined above. However, it could be argued that, for various
reasons, part-time permanent employees, paid apprentices and trainees,
self-employed, and unpaid family workers could also be considered
special categories. Part-time permanent employees fall very near the
standard, apprentices and trainees are, by definition, in transitory posi-
tions, and self-employed and unpaid family workers depart from the
usual “labor market,” especially in Italy and Spain, where they tend to
represent the past rather than the future, linked, as they are, to such tra-
ditional activities as agriculture and trade and hotels and restaurants.
Table 4.1 The Extent of Nonstandard Work in Italy and Spain (%), 1996 
All Males Females
Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy
Permanent full-time 
employees 44.6 56.4 47.5 57.0 39.3 55.1
Permanent part-time 
employees 1.6 4.3 0.5 1.4 3.7 10.0
Temporary full-time 
employees 23.6 6.8 23.7 6.5 23.4 7.3
Temporary part-time 
employees 3.0 1.6 1.1 0.9 6.7 2.8
Paid apprentices and 
trainees 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.0 1.5
Self-employed 21.0 25.0 23.2 29.1 16.7 1.3
Unpaid family workers 2.4 2.7 1.8 2.3 3.6 3.6
Unknown 2.5 1.8 0.9 1.6 5.6 2.3
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel, third wave.
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However, as already noted, there has been a growing trend in Italy for a
specific category of self-employed workers. Despite these caveats, the
following analysis will focus on full-time temporary, part-time tempo-
rary, and self-employed workers (including in some instances family
workers). 
It should be stressed that this classification derives from standard
statistical classification criteria; that is, it is based on the respondents’
own description of their contract situation. Thus, temporary work is a
general expression that refers to any kind of contract that is of limited
duration,17 even though its precise limits may not be known (this occurs
when the contract is signed for the duration of a certain task, which
may be uncertain). On the other hand, part-time work is not defined by
any legal arrangement; rather, the ECHP considers work fewer than 30
hours a week to be part-time, unless workers claim they work full-time
when asked the reason for working less than this threshold.18 This
method and definition follows the usual Eurostat criterion generally
used in the European Labor Force Survey.
It should also be mentioned that other forms of nonstandard work
are emerging in both countries, mainly “independent” workers,
freelancers, and other forms that generally fall outside the realm of
labor law. This is especially true in Italy, where the “second genera-
tion” self-employed, who make up an estimated one-third of the mea-
sured self-employed, have become the second most common form of
employment after the standard open-ended contract (Bologna and
Fumagalli 1997). This group of self-employed is mainly professional,
skilled workers.19 In Spain, the trend applies to the construction and
personal and business services sectors, but no detailed information
exists on its evolution and significance within the labor market.
The data in Table 4.1 show significantly more nonstandard work in
Spain than in Italy. Under its broad definition, 55.4 percent of all
employed individuals in Spain work under nonstandard arrangements,
a proportion that could challenge the qualifier “standard.” In Italy, 41.7
work in nonstandard arrangements, clearly below the 50 percent cutoff.
Under the narrower criterion noted above that limits nonstandard work
to temporary, full-, and part-time workers, however, 26.6 percent of
Spain’s employed population would be considered nonstandard, while
only 8.4 percent of Italian workers fall in this category. 
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There are two main differences between the two countries: the
share of full-time temporary workers in Spain is much larger than in
Italy: 24 percent versus 7 percent, while self-employment is more com-
mon in Italy than in Spain. Part-time work composes a relatively small
share of nonstandard work, although somewhat higher in Italy than in
Spain owing mainly to the number of permanent part-time workers.
The picture changes slightly by gender. Female part-time workers rep-
resent nearly 13 percent of total female employment in Italy and
approximately 10 percent in Spain, the main difference again stem-
ming from the number of permanent part-time workers. In any case,
these numbers are far lower than those observed in other European
countries.
Figure 4.4 shows the evolution of nonstandard work in Italy and
Spain, as indicated by changing trends in part-time and temporary
work among total employed. Figure 4.4 is based on ELFS data, which
differ somewhat from those presented above. The series dates from the
early 1990s, with the exception of temporary work in Spain, which
dates from 1987 (the first year for which information is available). 
Figure 4.4 The Share of Part-Time and Temporary Employees in Italy 
and Spain, 1987–99
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There are three striking trends in Figure 4.4. The first is the rapidly
rising share of temporary work in Spain in the late 1980s and early
1990s. However, since 1992, the proportion has remained stable; it
would seem that the Spanish economy had reached some “steady state”
in terms of the proportion of temporary work.
The second clear trend is the rise, albeit more modest, in temporary
work in Italy, with clear seasonal patterns. The more recent data show
some acceleration in the rise of temporary work, as well as a diminish-
ment in seasonal patterns, which may result from the 1997 Treu Act (see
above). Nevertheless, the rate of variation is modest compared with
Spain in the late 1980s (the two scales used for both series are the same).
The third trend is the modest rise in the share of part-time work in
both countries, from roughly 6 percent in the early 1990s to approxi-
mately 8 percent in the late 1990s. It appears that both firms and work-
ers have preferred different ways of achieving flexibility, involving
higher, albeit maybe more unstable, hours and earnings. Still, the share
of part-time work in female employment is close to 20 percent in
Spain. Very little information is available on the other forms of non-
standard work, including the underground economy, probably because
they are still a new, and small, part of the economy. 
We now present the characteristics of the three main groups of
nonstandard workers: temporary workers, part-time workers, and self-
employed. Table 4.2 compares the main characteristics of temporary
workers and permanent workers in both countries as of April–May
1999. More women than men both in Italy20 and in Spain work in tem-
porary employment, although the differences are slightly higher in
Italy. Temporary workers tend to be younger in both countries (but
more so in Spain) than permanent workers.21 It is striking that, despite
being younger, temporary workers have lower educational attainment
levels, especially in Spain and also for Italian males. This trend toward
relatively unskilled work is confirmed by the data on occupations.
Thus, temporary workers tend to be concentrated in elementary occu-
pations, as well as service and sales occupations.
In any case, the differences are larger in Spain. On average, there is
a 7 percentage point difference between Spanish male temporary and
permanent workers across the various occupations, and only a 4.3 per-
centage point difference among Italian men. For females, the differ-
ences are also somewhat higher in Spain: 4.6 percentage points on
103
Table 4.2 Characteristics of Temporary and Permanent Employees, Italy and Spain, 1999 (%)
ITALY SPAIN


















15–29 years 19.9 47.3 22.9 46.7 16.7 52.3 21.3 55.7
30–39 years 32.0 27.5 33.8 31.3 28.7 24.5 32.3  25.5
40–49 years 29.1 13.6 28.6 14.7 29.2 14.3 28.7  12.8
50–64 years 19.0 11.6 14.8 7.4 25.4 8.9 17.6 6.0
Level of education
No education/primary school 12.0 16.4 8.0 10.9 28.3 30.4 20.9  18.9
Lower secondary level 40.8 41.4 28.3 28.4 30.8 43.2 27.9  37.8
Upper secondary level 37.1 34.1 48.9 44.1 22.5 16.9 22.3  21.3
University 10.1 8.1 14.8 16.6 18.4 9.5 29.0  22.0
Occupational groups (1 digit
ISCO-88)
Managers 2.8 1.1 0.9 0.3 3.8 0.6 1.2 0.2
Professionals 6.2 5.9 9.1 9.6 11.7 6.0 19.9  12.6
Technicians 18.0 12.3 31.1 23.0 11.7 5.2 11.8 7.4
Clerks 12.6 9.1 21.0 16.8 9.7 3.7 20.6  14.8
Services and sales workers 9.8 10.1 14.4 17.1 11.9 8.7 19.8  27.1





















Plant and machine operators 15.2 10.0 6.6 4.1 16.1 12.8 4.2 5.9
Elementary occupations 8.5 22.3 9.5 21.4 9.5 27.0 19.4  26.6
Industries
Agriculture 2.4 11.8 1.3 9.6 2.9 8.4 0.9 4.9
Mining and energy 2.2 1.0 0.5 0.2 2.4 1.0 0.5 0.3
Manufacturing 31.9 20.3 22.7 14.3 28.7 21.4 12.4 14.2
Construction 9.5 16.5 1.1 1.2 8.9 32.3 1.1 1.2
Wholesale and retail, repairs 9.4 10.2 11.0 10.6 12.9 10.2 14.5 18.3
Hotels and restaurants 2.1 4.5 2.9 6.3 3.7 5.2 5.1 9.9
Transportation, communications 8.4 5.4 3.6 2.5 7.8 4.9 3.6 2.8
Financial services 4.4 0.8 4.1 2.3 4.5 0.6 3.3 1.9
Business services 3.5 4.8 6.4 7.6 5.4 4.8 9.5 8.6
Public administration 13.5 11.1 10.4 11.7 10.2 3.8 10.2 4.5
Education, health 9.4 8.4 29.8 23.0 8.4 4.6 26.7 18.8
Other services 3.3 5.19 6.2 10.8 4.1 2.7 12.3 14.6
Work status
Full-time 98.7 76.1 87.5 59.8 99.0 93.2 87.4 72.4
Part-time 1.3 23.9 12.5 40.2 1.0 6.8 12.6 27.6
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey.
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average versus 3.8 percentage points for Italy. Temporary work tends
to be concentrated in more volatile sectors, such as agriculture, con-
struction, and tourism. Again, the differences are larger in Spain,
although only for males, a result attributable to the differences in the
construction sector.
On the whole, temporary workers tend to be concentrated, both in
Spain and in Italy, in relatively less-skilled occupations; in addition,
individuals who hold these jobs are relatively young. This is interest-
ing, especially given the rather high proportion of temporary workers
in Spain, because it implies that rather than opening the labor market as
a whole, the move toward nonstandard work has catered to special seg-
ments of labor demand, where transitory work needs are more preva-
lent. Despite the large hole created by temporary work in Spain, it
appears to have remained concentrated in activities and occupations
where it might not pay to offer the worker a permanent status. In Italy,
the thrust of the legislation has always been to allow temporary con-
tracts for temporary tasks; it is quite interesting that in Spain, despite
the much wider extent of legislation, the actual reach has not been, in
general, different. 
Of course, the question that arises is whether temporary tasks war-
rant that one-third of the workforce have a temporary status, especially
when comparing the situation in Italy, with presumably similar sea-
sonal peaks of activity. This is a difficult question to answer. One ele-
ment to be taken into account is the resilience of the share of temporary
workers in the face of the various reforms introduced in the 1990s
aimed at curbing such work. This resilience might support the argu-
ment that the roughly one-third of temporary employees represents a
collective choice by firms based on their economic situation. On the
other hand, there is a general belief that the proportion is too high given
the temporary needs of firms. This view is evident in the 1997 agree-
ment, whose aim was to foster employment stability by reducing the
proportion of temporary workers. Thus, there seems to be a conflict
between the microeconomic behavior of firms and the aggregate view
of the social partners (and society at large). We shall return to this point
in our concluding remarks. 
Turning to part-time work, Table 4.3 presents the main characteris-
tics of part-time and full-time workers in both countries as of April–
May 1999. Not surprisingly given the large proportion of temporary
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15–29 years 21.7 37.0 25.5 26.6 26.9 61.4 32.9 35.2
30–39 years 31.7 28.4 32.3 39.7 27.6 19.9 30.3 28.3
40–49 years 28.3 16.3 27.8 22.6 25.0 9.6 23.9 19.7
50–64 years 18.4 18.2 14.4 11.1 20.5 9.1 12.9 16.8
Level of education
No education/primary school 12.1 19.2 7.5 13.3 29.3 15.8 17.5 32.6
Lower secondary level 41.0 38.3 27.1 34.5 34.8 31.7 30.5 35.4
Upper secondary level 36.9 34.7 49.2 44.1 20.5 28.4 23.2 16.3
University 10.0 7.9 16.3 8.1 15.4 24.1 28.9 15.8
Occupational groups (1 digit 
ISCO-88)
Managers 2.8 0.6 0.9 0.2 2.8 0.8 1.0 0.1
Professionals 6.1 6.4 10.1 3.9 9.7 18.5 19.1 9.3
Technicians 17.7 14.0 31.9 20.9 9.7 10.4 11.3 5.8
Clerks 12.3 11.1 20.9 18.0 7.8 8.7 20.4 9.9
Services and sales workers 9.8 12.2 13.0 24.1 10.6 21.5 21.6 25.9
Crafts/skilled blue collars 24.8 22.7 7.9 5.79 28.3 11.6 4.2 2.2
Plant and machine operators 15.1 7.2 6.7 3.69 15.2 8.8 5.4 2.1
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Elementary occupations 9.1 25.8 8.6 23.4 14.9 19.7 17.0 44.7
Armed forces 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Industries
Agriculture 3.0 10.7 1.9 4.3 4.6 6.1 2.6 0.9
Mining and energy 2.2 1.2 0.5 0.3 2.0 0.9 0.5 0.2
Manufacturing 31.6 12.4 22.9 15.0 26.8 13.0 14.7 5.4
Construction 10.0 11.0 1.0 1.4 16.6 4.7 1.3 0.6
Wholesale and retail, repairs 9.4 11.9 9.9 16.6 12.0 14.2 16.1 14.4
Hotels and restaurants 2.2 4.3 2.8 6.3 3.9 14.5 6.3 9.0
Transportation, 
communications 8.3 5.0 3.7 2.2 6.9 5.9 3.5 2.5
Financial services 4.2 1.2 4.0 3.8 3.4 1.1 3.1 1.2
Business services 3.5 5.4 5.6 11.3 5.1 10.5 8.2 13.4
Public administration 13.2 18.1 11.0 8.0 8.3 3.2 9.3 3.0
Education, health 9.2 10.8 31.5 15.9 6.9 16.2 25.9 15.2
Other services 3.3 8.0 5.2 15.1 3.5 9.5 8.5 34.2
Type of labor contract
Permanent 93.4 36.8 91.6 69.8 69.9 24.5 69.2 45.9
Temporary 6.7 63.2 8.4 30.2 30.1 75.5 30.8 54.1
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey. 
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workers among part-time employees, the latter tend to share some of
the features of temporary workers. However, there are also significant
differences. First, male part-time workers are, to a large extent, tempo-
rary workers in Italy and Spain, and also quite young, especially in
Spain; however, their share in part-time work is quite small (around 25
percent). Spanish female part-time workers tend to be younger than
full-time workers, although this is not the case in Italy, where the
modal group among part-time workers is 30–39 years. Female part-
time workers also tend to be more unskilled, as suggested by their
lower level of education and, above all, by their strong concentration in
the elementary occupations (mostly in Spain) and in the sales and ser-
vices occupations (mostly in Italy), these being the two least skill-
demanding occupational groups. Personal services as well as tourism
concentrate the largest shares of part-time females in both countries.
On the whole, part-time work does not seem to have made strong
inroads in either Italy or Spain. Despite the efforts to promote it, espe-
cially among women, young Italian and Spanish women are more
inclined to work full-time, and are moving away from the traditional
role of child-rearing that the cultural values have tended to assign their
mothers (Comi 2001). The low fertility rates and the rapidly increasing
female labor force participation rates are evidence of these trends. The
existence of other forms of nonstandard, flexible arrangements, such as
independent work and the underground economy in Italy and tempo-
rary work in Spain, seem to be the main factor behind these trends.
Finally, Table 4.4 presents the characteristics of self-employed
using the same variables included in the preceding two tables. To avoid
possible biases, the agricultural sector has been omitted from the analy-
sis. The most striking feature of Table 4.4 is that self-employed work-
ers are significantly older than employees. Thus, 70 percent of both
Italian male and female self-employed are age 40 or over, whereas the
corresponding figures for employees are 46 percent (males) and 40
percent (females). In Spain, the self-employed are somewhat younger
(60 percent of men and 58 percent of women are age 40 or older), but
they are still, on average, older than employees. Correspondingly, their
level of education is also lower. 
The occupational breakdown is not very significant, given that the
classification bears in part on the position of the worker in the produc-
tion process. Thus, the concentration in services and craftsmen (and
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Table 4.4 Characteristics of Nonagricultural Self-Employed and Dependent Workers, Italy and Spain, 1999 (%)
ITALY SPAIN






















15–29 years 14.8 22.2 4.7 25.9 14.1 27.9 15.2 33.1
30–39 years 15.7 31.7 24.4 33.6 25.5 27.2 27.1 29.9
40–49 years 20.5 27.9 41.2 26.9 29.0 24.6 28.0 23.3
50–64 years 49.1 18.2 29.8 13.7 31.3 20.3 29.7 13.8
Level of education
No education/primary school 34.2 11.5 25.1 7.7 37.3 27.5 37.0 19.6
Lower secondary level 32.9 40.7 38.2 27.9 31.7 34.7 32.8 31.2
Upper secondary level 25.3 37.5 17.4 49.2 17.1 21.4 15.5 22.2
University 7.6 10.3 19.3 15.3 13.8 16.3 14.7 27.0
Occupational groups (1 digit
 ISCO-88)
Managers 4.9 2.8 1.2 0.8 34.7 2.9 42.5 0.8
Professionals 6.4 6.5 11.7 9.4 8.3 10.5 9.7 17.7
Technicians 9.1 17.9 3.9 30.7 7.2 10.0 5.7 10.4
Clerks 0.4 12.6 8.3 20.8 1.4 8.1 3.8 18.9
Services and sales workers 31.8 10.1 65.7 15.0 5.0 11.7 25.6 23.0
Crafts/skilled blue collars 28.6 24.5 13.0 7.4 27.0 26.9 5.3 3.5
Plant and machine
operators

























Elementary occupations 15.7 8.3 6.8 9.5 2.7 13.5 3.8 20.7
Armed forces 0.0 2.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
Industries
Mining and energy 0.1 2.2 0.0 0.5 0.3 2.1 0.1 0.4
Manufacturing 17.1 31.9 21.8 22.1 15.6 27.6 9.4 13.4
Construction 18.1 10.4 0.6 1.1 18.1 17.0 1.4 1.2
Wholesale and retail, repairs 37.9 9.8 55.2 11.2 28.0 12.6 46.5 16.1
Hotels and restaurants 6.5 2.4 2.9 3.4 10.9 4.4 16.1 6.9
Transportation, 
communications
2.8 8.4 0.4 3.5 11.5 7.2 1.6 3.4
Financial services 1.5 4.2 0.7 4.0 2.2 3.9 2.0 3.6
Business services 6.9 3.7 4.2 6.7 7.9 4.9 6.7 8.5
Public administration 0.1 13.8 0.1 10.8 0.0 8.6 0.1 8.4
Education, health 2.2 9.7 10.6 29.7 2.5 7.7 6.0 24.7
Other services 6.8 3.6 3.6 6.9 3.1 3.9 10.1 13.4
Work status
Part-time 87.0 96.8 88.6 84.2 97.0 97.2 84.1 81.8
Full-time 13.0 3.2 11.4 15.8 3.0 2.8 15.9 18.2
SOURCE: European Labor Force Survey.
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also “managers” in Spain) is related to the fact that these people work
on their own. Construction, trade, and tourism are more prevalent
among self-employed. General industrial concentration is higher in
Italy, where the mean between the distribution of employees and self-
employed is 8.4 for males (compared with 5.5 in Spain) and 8.0 for
females (7.2 in Spain). This suggests a more concentrated distribution
of self-employment in Italy.
On the whole, self-employment in Italy and Spain is hardly a new
development. Although the proportion of self-employed workers is rel-
atively stable over time, these are workers who, in general, are in tradi-
tional activities in the construction, trade, and hotels/restaurants
sectors. New trends in nonstandard work may be found, especially in
Italy, in the externalization of work that is quite common in construc-
tion and services. These workers are formally self-employed, but they
depend on a single provider for work. The frontier between “labor” and
“mercantile” exchanges is rather thin in cases such as these. 
THE WELFARE OF NONSTANDARD WORKERS
The final element in our analysis is the consequences for workers
of their status as nonstandard workers. We present data from the ECHP
covering the period 1994–1996. On the basis of the classification used
in Table 4.1, we review nonstandard workers’ wages (only available
for employees), poverty levels, job and general satisfaction, and transi-
tions from nonstandard work.
Table 4.5 presents information on wage and poverty of the differ-
ent work categories defined in Table 4.1. Wage data suggest that tem-
porary workers earn less per hour than permanent workers, the
differences being somewhat larger in Spain than in Italy. However,
before concluding that there is discrimination against workers in Spain,
one should remember that wage differences are explained by many
other factors beyond the contract type. For example, temporary work-
ers tend to be much younger and less skilled, two factors likely to
affect wages between temporary and permanent workers. Econometric
evidence is inconclusive on this point, and even the methods for deter-
mining whether the differences are discriminatory are subject to









Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
Permanent full-time employees 6.5 7.6 6.2 4.5 5.4 5.0 2.0 1.8
Permanent part-time employees 6.7 7.8 2.4 5.6 4.4 6.1 1.1 3.4
Fixed-term full-time employees 4.5 4.5 28.0 13.5 22.4 19.6 12.9 7.3
Fixed-term part-time employees 5.3 4.6 28.3 21.6 30.0 19.7 15.7 8.5
Paid apprentices and trainees 4.6 3.9 21.1 23.5 21.3 30.1 13.2 22.1
Self-employed — — 14.9 22.6 19.1 20.5 10.3 9.6
Unpaid family workers — — 19.5 27.2 20.8 24.9 11.6 11.2
NOTE: “Poverty line 1” refers to current (1996) monthly household income (in adult equivalent per capita terms). “Poverty line 2”
refers to total household income in previous (1995) year (in adult equivalent per capita terms). Persistent poverty is living below
poverty line 2 in the three waves for which data exist (data refer to the years 1993, 1994, and 1995).
a Purchasing Power Parity based on the value of the European currency unit.
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel.
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debate. Recent estimates for Spain (Davia and Hernanz 2000) suggest
that, once the characteristics of the jobs and the workers themselves are
controlled, the difference would be favorable to temporary workers.
Part-time workers, when taken together, have lower hourly wages
(not shown in the table). However, once the duration of the contract is
controlled, as in Table 4.5, they appear to earn more. This is a result
that is fairly general, as suggested in previous work (Cebrián, Moreno,
and Toharia 2001; Villosio and Garrone 2001), which also suggests
that the dichotomy between part-time and full-time is far from clear for
all countries, and that a more disaggregated breakdown in terms of the
working week would be more sensible in most cases.
On the whole, the wage information does not clearly indicate that
nonstandard workers are “worse off.” Those under temporary contracts
do earn less per hour, but this is, to a large extent, a consequence of
their characteristics: younger and less skilled. In the case of part-time
workers, when controlling for the duration of their contract, their
hourly wage is higher.
Table 4.5 also includes three poverty indicators. The first two are
the percentage of people in each group whose household income
(defined in terms of monthly total earnings and of yearly total income)
is below a “poverty line,” defined as 50 percent of the average house-
hold income for each country, defined in adult-equivalent terms.22 The
third measure attempts to address the likely—and correct—criticism
that the two previous indicators may capture situations of transitory
low income. Thus, rather than considering those in poverty for any one
year, this last indicator measures “persistent poverty,” defined as being
in poverty (according to the indicator based on yearly income) in each
of the three observations available.
The analysis of these poverty indicators suggests several conclu-
sions. First, permanent part-time workers have poverty levels similar to
those of permanent full-time workers. Similarly, there are no signifi-
cant differences between temporary part-time and full-time workers. In
other words, the main differences among employees refer to the dura-
tion of the contract rather than the duration of the working week.
The second conclusion is that differences between temporary and
permanent workers are larger in Italy than in Spain, especially in the
case of persistent poverty. Third, paid apprentices and trainees show
the highest poverty indicators, especially in Spain.
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Of more interest, however, is the situation of the self-employed.
They are clearly worse off than permanent employees; however, their
relative position vis-à-vis temporary workers varies in both countries.
Although in Italy, they tend to be better off, in Spain, they are worse
off. This should be interpreted in terms of the gap between temporary
and permanent workers, which is clearly higher in Italy than in Spain.
A comparison of the various indices—lower persistent poverty and
their higher cross-section indicator—also suggests more variability in
income for the Spanish self-employed. Finally, unpaid family workers
tend to be in a worse position than self-employed workers; the specific
concentration of these workers in terms of industries and occupations
is probably behind this result.
Additional elements needed to assess the relative well-being of
nonstandard workers are provided by the information on job satisfac-
tion included in Table 4.6. The index used is the proportion of people
whose satisfaction score is five or six on a scale of one to six.23 The
most striking differences are found for job security, type of work, and
number of working hours. Nonstandard work provides, by definition,
less job security, which might explain why temporary workers are less
satisfied on this measure. One interesting aspect is the difference
between permanent workers in Spain and Italy. In Spain, the propor-
tion of those satisfied with their job security is significantly higher than
in Italy. One interpretation is that the wedge between permanent and
temporary work is considered wider by Spanish permanent workers,
who may perceive less threat to their position owing to the large seg-
ment of temporary workers. Self-employed worker satisfaction is simi-
lar to that of permanent employees in Italy, but it is clearly lower in
Spain, although it tends to be higher than it is for temporary workers.
Temporary and permanent workers in Italy, but not in Spain, have
different levels of satisfaction, probably owing to the larger reach of
temporary work in Spain. In both countries, unpaid family workers
report lower satisfaction levels.
In terms of the number of working hours, nonstandard workers are
less satisfied than permanent workers in both Italy and Spain. This is
interesting because the specific working time dimension included in
the classification (namely, part-time versus full-time) does not appear
to be significant, implying that part-time workers are not particularly
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Table 4.6 Satisfaction with Various Aspects of Work, Italy and Spain, 1996 (%)
SATISF-1 SATISF-2 SATISF-3 SATISF-4 SATISF-5 SATISF-6 SATISF-7
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
Permanent full-
time employees
18.8 19.4 53.4 70.6 50.1 59.9 40.0 48.3 42.3 56.0 41.1 54.6 49.7 57.7
Permanent part-
time employees
10.0 20.1 44.8 69.4 41.6 46.3 50.9 62.2 53.9 61.1 47.2 64.5 52.2 67.2
Fixed-term full-
time employees
13.9 15.5 16.1 25.1 35.8 50.2 26.2 39.5 29.4 46.4 36.3 50.3 39.3 46.3
Fixed-term part-
time employees
3.4 13.2 15.5 30.4 33.1 41.8 27.6 37.0 37.3 56.5 42.2 59.3 45.7 52.0
Paid apprentices 
and trainees
12.2 22.2 17.7 36.7 39.5 58.4 27.1 52.6 28.0 61.2 34.7 62.2 43.7 69.9
Self-employed 15.4 13.1 43.1 39.3 53.4 57.4 21.9 26.2 31.3 43.3 47.9 55.7 58.0 67.7
Unpaid family 
workers
1.5 12.8 48.5 29.1 35.3 31.2 19.5 22.4 28.0 29.4 46.2 51.0 68.6 77.9
SATISF-1: satisfaction with earnings in present job
SATISF-2: satisfaction with job security in present job
SATISF-3: satisfaction with type of work in present job
SATISF-4: satisfaction with number of working hours in present job
SATISF-5: satisfaction with working times (daytime, nighttime, shifts, etc.) in present job
SATISF-6: satisfaction with working conditions/environment in present job
SATISF-7: satisfaction with distance to work/commuting in present job
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel (percentage of workers whose satisfaction score is 5 or 6 on a 1–6 scale).
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unhappy (vis-à-vis their full-time counterparts) with their working
time.
Table 4.7 presents information on more general indicators of satis-
faction not specifically related to the job currently held. The first indi-
cator refers to satisfaction with “work or main activity” and may be
considered a summary indicator of overall job satisfaction (as opposed
to its various aspects, as considered in Table 4.6). In Italy, there are
clear differences between permanent full-time employees and the self-
employed, on the one hand, and the remaining categories, on the other.
In Spain, although these differences are evident, they are much less
pronounced, indicating once again that nonstandard workers seem to
fare more poorly in Italy. The other significant indicator reported in
Table 4.7 refers to satisfaction with their financial situation. In this
case, a clear difference exists between permanent workers (only full-
time for Italy) and the other nonstandard categories. The findings tend
to mirror those based on the poverty indicators included in Table 4.5.
In this case, however, the differences appear to be larger in Spain than
in Italy, probably owing to the general lower satisfaction of permanent
employees in Spain.
Finally, Table 4.8 addresses work transition between 1995 and
1996. Three transitions are included: an improvement (labeled “bet-
ter”), that is, achieving a permanent status (or a full-time status for per-
manent part-timers); deterioration (“worse”), including a transition to
all other employment statuses; and joblessness, both searching for
work or not. Permanent full-time employees and self-employed work-
ers have the most stable situations. Approximately 80 percent to 85
percent remained in the same situation for the two years observed. For
all other categories, the probability of remaining in the same job situa-
tion is generally less than 50 percent, although improving the situation
is not always the most prevalent destination. 
The time span of this information is too limited to extract substan-
tial conclusions. However, the information does suggest that being a
nonstandard worker is, for many, a relatively transitory situation. Of
course, it could be that workers in nonstandard contracts rotate
between work and unemployment, as the data in Table 4.8 suggest.
However, longer-term data are needed to better assess this hypothesis. 
In Italy, permanence in a work contract is relatively common for
part-time women, and the percentage of conversion from part-time to
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Table 4.7 Satisfaction with Various Aspects of Life, Italy and Spain, 1996 (%) 
SATISF-1 SATISF-2 SATISF-3 SATISF-4
Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain Italy Spain
Permanent full-time employees 40.5 57.6 19.9 24.7 49.1 56.5 25.2 27.5
Permanent part-time employees 24.5 58.6 13.0 27.9 57.9 58.4 31.6 34.8
Fixed-term full-time employees 29.3 45.9 11.5 16.4 43.4 53.1 28.6 24.9
Fixed-term part-time employees 19.2 38.6 13.3 9.3 50.5 47.1 33.2 35.0
Paid apprentices and trainees 29.3 56.9 9.5 21.3 38.6 55.3 26.8 31.4
Self-employed 42.7 49.8 17.8 16.1 51.0 54.5 16.0 16.8
Unpaid family workers 24.3 33.1 13.5 14.4 50.2 56.1 24.6 28.8
SATISF-1: satisfaction with work or main activity 
SATISF-2: satisfaction with financial situation
SATISF-3: satisfaction with housing situation
SATISF-4: satisfaction with amount of leisure time
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel (percentage of workers whose satisfaction score is 5 or 6 on a 1–6 scale).
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ITALY SPAIN
Same Worse Better Jobless Same Worse Better Jobless
Permanent full-time employees 83.9 10.7 5.4 86.9 8.2 4.9
Permanent part-time employees 45.5 10.7 27.7 16.1 44.6 13.0 28.3 14.1
Fixed-term full-time employees 41.4 12.4 29.2 16.9 54.9 7.3 15.3 22.5
Fixed-term part-time employees 28.8 32.7 13.5 25.0 25.4 27.1 17.0 30.5
Paid apprentices and trainees 20.8 18.2 31.2 29.9 13.0 29.6 16.7 40.7
Self-employed 83.9 3.5 2.8 9.8 78.4 7.0 2.9 11.7
Unpaid family workers 43.5 15.8 1.8 38.8 27.1 25.2 1.2 46.5
NOTE: “Same”: refers to the situation being the same in both years. “Better”: refers to a worker who moved to a permanent status (for
permanent part-time: the worker achieves a full-time status). “Worse”: refers to all other employment situations. “Jobless”: means the
person is no longer working (for whatever reason).
SOURCE: European Community Household Panel.
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full-time drops with increasing age (Isfol 1998). As for temporary
workers, recent data24 show that temporary contracts were the mode of
entry into dependent employment for 30 percent of young people who
found a job in 1995 and in 1997, while 20 percent became self-
employed. Of those entering with a temporary contract, only 21 per-
cent went on to a permanent employment contract within three years
(36 percent within five years), while 38 percent (27 percent within five
years) were still employed with a temporary contract, and 38 percent
(30 percent within five years) were either unemployed or out of the
labor force. Moving into stable employment from temporary work is
more common for men in the northern regions, and for those with
higher education in all regions.
In Spain, where the proportion of temporary workers has remained
stable for the past eight years, the characteristics of temporary workers
remain basically the same over time, especially in terms of age.25 This
implies that as they grow older, temporary workers cease to be tempo-
rary. A cohort approach, based on the age of birth, suggests that inte-
gration into permanent work is still the dominant feature of labor
market careers in Spain, although at a lower pace than in the past. 
On the whole, nonstandard workers appear to be poorer and less
satisfied than standard employees. However, and this is a key point,
nonstandard workers do not appear to get trapped in their situation. On
the contrary, many end up in a permanent, “standard” situation. If this
is the case, and this is probably more so in Spain than in Italy, social
policy should be more concerned with situations that may trap workers
(given that exceptions may exist to the general rule) than with non-
standard work itself, the causes of which may be more structural and
less institutional. A further point relates to the length of time it takes
nonstandard workers, especially younger individuals, to attain a stan-
dard status, given that this could also be deemed too long (although,
obviously, this is a value judgment). In addition, the possible ineffi-
ciencies involved in the current Spanish situation should not be over-
looked. We shall return to these in our conclusion.
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CONCLUSION
In this chapter, we have compared nonstandard work in Italy and
Spain, which share various institutional features in the labor market,
particularly their presumed rigidity vis-à-vis workers who hold a per-
manent status, as well as other social and cultural values. However,
although current unemployment rates appear to be converging, the
Spanish experience over the last 20 years has been plagued with higher
joblessness. This has meant a more aggressive response by policymak-
ers, who have tried to fight this problem through a variety of measures,
including various labor market reforms aimed at breaking the dominant
standard model, and then subsequently restoring it.
What are the lessons to be learned from these experiences? First,
nonstandard work does not appear to be increasing, at least not signifi-
cantly. The upward trend is clearer in Italy, but the share of nonstand-
ard work arrangements is not high, although newer forms of
independent work are expanding quickly. In Spain, on the other hand,
the declared objective is to reduce the extent of nonstandard work,
mostly temporary work. 
Is nonstandard work a solution to unemployment? In both coun-
tries, a period of high employment followed the introduction of more
nonstandard forms of work—in Spain after the 1984 reforms, and in
Italy after the 1997 reforms. However, it is far from clear that one
could relate the two phenomena (no matter what policymakers might
have claimed, especially in Spain).
Is nonstandard work creating different categories, strata, or
“classes” of workers? The Spanish case would suggest that jobs are
segmented. In addition, income and mobility data suggest that non-
standard workers are in no worse a position in terms of welfare and are
not permanently trapped in their situation. 
Is nonstandard work a response to the need for flexibility in uncer-
tain market conditions, including seasonal variations? Very likely this
is so. In Italy, this needed flexibility has been channeled mainly
through the underground economy and, more recently, through new
forms of self-employment, although more recently the expanded possi-
bilities for using fixed-term contracts and temporary work have also
enlarged the share of this flexible employment form.
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The question remains why the Spanish economy appears to need
one-third of its employees in a temporary status, while Italy does well
with only a 10 percent to 15 percent temporary workforce. It is true
that, in Italy, more than 60 percent of new hires are nonstandard work
contracts and other forms of nonstandard work, mainly independent
work, as well as the underground economy, and these forms of
employment may fill, at least in part, the gap between the figures pre-
sented. However, labor mobility figures, as represented by the propor-
tion of employed workers with tenure of less than a year (see Figure
4.4), suggest much greater labor mobility in Spain.
There are, then, two basic questions in the case of Spain. First, why
do firms appear to have such a strong preference for temporary (or
fixed-term) contracts? Second, does the current rate of temporary work
imply some level of social inefficiency? The first question may be
answered rather straightforwardly: temporary contracts are simply
cheaper; conversely, firing costs are too high. This answer, dear to
some Spanish economists (see, e.g., Dolado, García, and Jimeno 2002)
is not fully satisfactory. As mentioned, the recent experiments to
reduce the costs of permanent contracts have not met with the expected
success. The number of permanent contracts did increase substantially,
but many of the contracts were likely a “deadweight” effect (contracts
now registered in search of the bonuses, which would have been signed
in any case. See Malo and Toharia 1999). Are firms being myopic?
Probably not, given that there are other, “psychological” costs; firms
have become accustomed to these contracts over the past 15 years and
are reluctant to hire employees under a permanent status because of
their greater uncertainty. Therefore, an initial cost calculation (in favor
of temporary work) has become so embedded in firms’ behavior (espe-
cially smaller ones) that its reversal is not as simple as a mere cost
reversal.
This naturally leads to the second question. Is the proportion of
temporary workers inefficiently high? First, the proportion of tempo-
rary workers sharply increased until 1992 and has remained stable
since, suggesting that firms had reached a “steady state” in their needs
for temporary workers (rooted in the inherent uncertainties of market
economies, as well as on seasonal patterns, which may be more pro-
nounced in Spain). This implies that firms do not want to have all their
workers under temporary contracts: permanent contracts do have
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advantages, as all personnel experts have known at least since Henry
Ford’s $5 wage.26 This seems to imply that there is some “optimal”
level of temporary workers. Is the current Spanish level an optimal
level? At the social level, probably not, as the usual declarations by the
various social partners suggest. If not, does it follow that firms are
being inefficient? It could be, but an alternative, more appealing inter-
pretation, in our view, is a gap between private efficiency and social
efficiency. In other words, temporary work would be generating nega-
tive externalities (not taken into account in a firm’s behavior). Such
externalities could include an inadequate level of training, the possible
side effects on the wage formation process,27 problems with the unem-
ployment compensation system, and more generally with social protec-
tion,28 or a delay in family formation and the related low fertility rates
(although these are certainly due to other factors as well). In addition,
and most important, firms may be hiring too many temporary workers
because other firms are doing the same. In other words, there is a
“coordination failure” similar to that involved, for example, in adopt-
ing inefficient QWERTY keyboards in typewriters and computers.29
Firms might meet their needs to use temporary work differently, but
only if all other firms did the same. 
Of course, this is only our interpretation of the Spanish situation,
and further research is needed, but it appears to be consistent with the
views expressed by the social partners in Spain. It suggests, though,
that the search for labor market flexibility, if taken too far, may create
unexpected inefficiencies along with some, albeit small, social distress.
The Italian labor market appears to be more diversified than that in
Spain. The increase in nonstandard work arrangements is the result of
different factors, some common to all western countries, others pecu-
liar to the Italian tradition and regulatory system. The recent easing of
the regulation of nonstandard work contracts in Italy has also contrib-
uted to the growth of these employment contracts.
Common factors on the demand side can be attributed to the
increasing role and greater diversification of the private service sector,
together with the quest for more flexible organizational patterns in the
industrial sector (owing to the increased volatility of final demand and
greater global competition). Other features include the fragmentation
of the production processes and the outsourcing of services and activi-
ties, which are facilitated by technological innovations. Supply-side
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factors are linked to the increased labor participation of new segments
of the labor force who have a lower attachment to the labor market:
women, youth, and older people. In addition, the supply of labor is
more stratified than in the past and, on average, presents higher educa-
tional and professional levels and a stronger individual capacity to bar-
gain for working conditions.
The peculiar composition of nonstandard work arrangements in
Italy is, on the other hand, linked to the specific institutional and regu-
latory position of labor contracts. The low use of temporary and part-
time contracts and the large share of self-employment and of employ-
ment in the shadow economy is the result of specific economic, social,
and cultural factors (De Luca and Bruni 1993; Reyneri 1996; Bologna
and Fumagalli 1997).
A specific feature of the Italian labor market is its low mobility.
Even within employment, the flow from one type of contract to another
is limited. Workers tend to remain employed in the same contractual
arrangement during their careers. This is especially true in the case of
part-time work. The entry pattern into employment is very important.
Remaining in a nonstandard contract may generate a vicious cycle of
precariousness, which is reflected in lower levels of social security pro-
tection (Rostagno and Utili 1998), training, and professional upgrad-
ing. 
Permanence in part-time and temporary work is greater for women
than for men, who have higher probabilities of changing to full-time
and permanent contracts. The possibility of going from nonstandard to
standard employment depends also on the economic conditions of the
various areas. In the strongest areas, the probability of shifting to stan-
dard contracts is much higher than in other, less-developed areas.30
In Italy, nonstandard work contracts usually imply less favorable
working, training, and earning conditions compared with permanent
full-time jobs, even if nonstandard dependent work is subject to the
same regulatory framework as standard dependent work (Istat 2000;
Isfol 1998). This could be one reason for low levels of satisfaction
among nonstandard Italian workers. The concentration of nonstandard
work among women, youth, and low-skilled workers calls for specific
policies to support their permanence in the labor market as well as their
professional upgrading. 
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Notes
1. The numbers implicit in these figures have been reconstructed by the authors from
various sources to solve the methodological breaks in the series.
2. These figures are from the European Labor Force Survey (ELFS). We would like
to thank Terry Ward, of Alphametrics Ltd. (United Kingdom), and Dominique
Gaudron, of Algoé (Paris), for making these data available to us.
3. It should be noted that the 2000 figure is not strictly comparable to those for pre-
vious years given that questions about tenure in the LFS changed in 1999. Since
1999, a distinction is made between tenure with the employer and tenure with the
current contract, whereas before the question referred to tenure in the current job,
which was generally interpreted as tenure with the current contract. However, the
numbers for 2000 in Figure 4.4 refer to tenure with the current employer, which is
higher to the extent that people may be hired several times by the same employer.
4. Reinstatement is compulsory only in establishments with more than 15 employ-
ees. Should the worker not wish to be reinstated, she or he receives additional
compensation amounting to 15 months’ pay. Smaller firms may choose between
rehiring or paying compensation, which depends on length of service and size of
the firm (the average compensation is equal to 2.5 to 6 months’ wages, reaching
10 months’ wages for workers with at least 10 years of tenure and 14 months for
workers with a tenure of at least 20 years).
5. Mobility benefits are more generous than the ordinary unemployment benefits.
Eligible workers must have been employed for at least 12 months and been laid
off within collective dismissals due to restructuring, economic crisis, or bank-
ruptcy of industrial companies with more than 15 employees or commercial com-
panies with more than 200 employees. The mobility benefit is 80 percent of gross
remuneration during the first year of unemployment, with a maximum threshold
equivalent to about 65 percent of the remuneration of the average worker. 
6. Inflation reached 25 percent in 1977.
7. For an early analysis of these changes, see Fina, Meixide, and Toharia (1989),
originally written in 1983.
8. This does not imply that economic dismissals were illegal; they just had to follow
a more complicated procedure involving negotiations with workers and the inter-
vention of administrative authorities.
9. Because such dismissal does not involve labor courts, a simple administrative
meeting between the parties, where the actual severance to be paid is agreed, is
enough; this happens in 70 percent of the dismissals undertaken by firms. The
most significant point here is that firms could avoid reinstatement of the worker in
almost all situations, with the only exception being those involving the violation
of basic union or human rights.
10. By restricting even more the possibilities of reinstatement and trying to clarify the
economic situations under which the dismissal was to be considered fair. Still, the
proportion of dismissals agreed before going to courts remained unchanged and
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the amounts agreed did not show any turnaround, thus suggesting that firms, and
workers, did not perceive any significant change.
11. The severance pay of unfair dismissal is 45 days’ wages per year of seniority with
a maximum of 42 months’ wages. The new contract introduced in 1997 reduced
this to 33 days, wages with a maximum of 24 months’ wages. Theoretically, fair
dismissals carry a cost of 20 days’ wages with a maximum of 12 months’ wages.
Although no precise information exists, the presumption of most analysts is that
actual dismissal costs are closer to the 45 days’ wages limits. See, for example,
Malo and Toharia (1999).
12. According to the civil code (art. 409) independent contracts are defined as “a
coordinate and continuous service, mainly individual even if not subordinate.”
13. This contractual arrangement implies that the firms have to gradually formalize
the irregular work position of their employees. At the same time, the “emerging
process” of the black market work can be carried out in a period of time agreed on
with the unions without any economic sanctions. Moreover, firms receive from
the state fiscal deductions and benefits, as if they were creating new employment
(Meldolesi 1998; Reyneri 1998). 
14. The regulation of these contracts established a minimum contract period of six
months, and the possibility of renewals up to a maximum of three years. Also,
these contracts carried severance pay at a rate of 12 days of wages per year of
seniority. The worker could not sue the employer for unfair dismissal at the expiry
of the contract.
15. Interestingly, the new open-ended contract not only carried lower severance pay
but also enjoyed substantial reductions of social charges to the point that, for up to
a two-year time horizon, hiring a worker under a permanent new contract was
marginally cheaper (including the costs of dismissals at the unfair rate) than carry-
ing out such a contract under a temporary status. The question is why the new
contract has not been used more extensively.
16. The ECHP is a European-wide project, the first wave of which was carried out in
1994. Six waves of interviews have been conducted, although only data from the
first three were available at the time of writing (May 2001). The ECHP is a panel
study, which follows households and individuals over time, and contains substan-
tial information on individuals and their households, including all sources of
income. The main drawback of the ECHP is its relatively small sample size,
which prevents detailed analysis in some countries and for some variables. Italy
and Spain do not pose particular problems in this respect. Our use of this data is
under contract no. ECHP/15/00 between Eurostat and the University of Alcalá.
17. That is, it includes workers under fixed-term as well as all kinds of purely tempo-
rary contracts.
18. This is important for Italy: if a strict 30-hour threshold is adopted as criterion, the
number of part-time workers would actually increase. This is due to the fact that
the formal work week of many full-time workers, mostly in education, is less than
30 hours.
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19. In fact, it only emerged when, in 1996, the government introduced a special pen-
sion fund for the self-employed excluded from the public pension system (includ-
ing those with VAT numbers).
20. These average national data are a bit misleading in the Italian case, due to the sig-
nificant territorial differences in economic and social development. For example,
although part-time work in northern Italy is mainly female, in southern Italy it is
more diffused among men; and in the case of fixed-term contracts, in the North
are mainly concentrated among young people, and in the South, they are mainly
diffused among adult men.
21. In Italy, work training contracts and apprenticeship contracts are included in
fixed-term contracts.
22. The equivalence scale (generally known as the OECD scale) attributes a weight of
1 to the first adult, 0.7 to the successive ones, and 0.5 to children under age 14.
23. Alternative indicators, such as the average score or the proportion of those unsat-
isfied (scores 1 or 2), could have been used; however, they all tend to provide a
similar picture.
24. Data are from answers to a specific question on the labor market situation three
and five years after the first temporary job; questions were introduced in the Octo-
ber 1999 Labor Force Survey (Istat 2000).
25. See Toharia et al. (1997) and Malo and Toharia (2000). These analyses take a
longer view than those based on Labor Force Survey data, which only follows
people for 15 months. For analyses based on this latter data, see Toharia (1996),
Alba-Ramirez (1997), Güell and Petrongolo (2000), and Amuedo-Dorantes
(2000).
26. See also Sumner Slichter’s 1919 Ph.D. dissertation on the turnover of factory
labor. This point should not be overemphasized, though. It is only meant to
remind that permanent contracts are advantageous to employers. It does not imply
that this is the only force behind such contracts. Industrial relations is a much
more two-sided matter.
27. This was a popular consequence mentioned in the early 1990s because it was
thought that the existence of a large pool of temporary workers would allow per-
manent workers to bargain for higher wages, thus imparting an inflationary bias to
the collective bargaining system. See Bentolila and Dolado (1994), and Jimeno
and Toharia (1993). Later wage developments seem to have disproved these argu-
ments.
28. In the sense that unemployment compensation provided to temporary workers is
much more costly, given their high turnover rates; in terms of pensions, one could
think of the lower contribution period in the long run, which might create prob-
lems far in the future.
29. See, for example, Ray (1998), chapter 5. The idea of a “coordination failure” goes
back to the work of Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in the1940s.
30. Part-time employment appears slightly higher in the north compared to the central
and the southern regions, owing to the sectoral composition of the regional econo-
mies. On the other hand, the spread of fixed-term employment is more varied
Nonstandard Work in Italy and Spain 127
from a territorial point of view, its rate being particularly high in the southern area
of the country, with peaks of 17 percent of female occupation. Here, too, the
growth rates of contractual fixed-term employment are higher than the national
average. The intense use in the south of temporary work contracts, where the offi-
cial unemployment rate is around 22 percent (compared to the national average of
12 percent and the average in the north of 6 percent) with high peaks of youth
unemployment, is an expression of a greater job precariousness; however, it also
indicates a greater fluidity of entry in a job market in a traditionally closed and
selective Italian market.
References
Adam, P., and P. Canziani. 1998. “Partial De-Regulation: Fixed-Term Con-
tracts in Italy and Spain.” Centre for Economic Performance. Working
paper no. 386. London: London School of Economics.
Alba-Ramírez, A. 1997. “How Temporary is Temporary Work in Spain?”
Working paper 97-14. Economics Series 08. Madrid: Universidad Carlos
III.
Amuedo-Dorantes, C. 2000. “Work Transitions into and out of Involuntary
Temporary Employment in a Segmented Market: Evidence from Spain.”
Industrial and Labor Relations Review 53(2): 309–325.
Barnard, C., J. Clark, and R. Lewis. 1995. “The Exercise of Individual
Employment Rights in the Member States of the European Community.”
Research series  no. 49. London: Employment Department.
Bassanini, C., and E. Donati. 2001. “Le Condizioni di Lavoro Nonstandard
Secondo Lavoratori e Lavoratrici.” In Le Forme del Lavoro, M. Samek
Lodovici and R. Semenza, eds. Milano: Franco Angeli, pp. 249–276.
Bentolila, S., and J.J. Dolado. 1994. “Labor Flexibility and Wages: Lessons
from Spain.” Economic Policy 18: 54–99.
Boeri, T. 1997. “Le Istituzioni del Mercato del Lavoro: Un Confronto Interna-
zionale.” In La Disoccupazione Italiana, S. de Nardis and G. Galli, eds.
Bolonia: Il Mulino.
Bologna, S., and A. Fumagalli. 1997. Il Lavoro Autonomo di Seconda Gener-
azione. Milano: Feltrinelli.
Cebrián, I., G. Moreno, and L. Toharia. 2001. “Trabajo a Tiempo Parcial y
Duración de la Jornada en la Unión Europea: Características, Salarios,
Pobreza.” In Análisis del Panel de Hogares de la Unión Europea, Luis
Garrido and Luis Toharia, eds. Madrid: Instituto Nacional de Estadística.
128 Cebrián et al.
Comi, S. 2001. “Il Part-Time in Italia e il Suo Ruolo Sulla Partecipazione
Femminile: Un’analisi Sui Microdati Banca D’Italia.” In Le Forme del
Lavoro, M. Samek Lodovici and R. Semenza, eds. Milano: Franco Angeli.
Davia, M. A., and V. Hernanz. 2002. “Temporary Employment and Segmen-
tation in the Spanish Labour Market: An Empirical Analysis through the
Study of Wage Differentials.” Documento de Trabajo 2002-26. Madrid:
FEDEA. Available at: <http:www.fedea.es>.
Dell’Aringa, C., and M. Samek Lodovici. 1997. “Policies for the Unemployed
and Social Shock Absorbers: The Italian Experience.” In Southern Euro-
pean Welfare States: Between Crisis and Reform, M. Rhodes, ed. London:
Frank Cass.
De Luca, L., and M. Bruni. 1993. Unemployment and Labor Market Flexibil-
ity: Italy. Geneva: International Labor Organization.
Dolado, J.J., C. García, and J.F. Jimeno. 2002. “Drawing Lessons from the
Boom of Temporary Jobs in Spain.” Economic Journal 112(480): 270–
295.
Fagan, C., and J. Rubery. 1996. “Transitions between Family Formation and
Paid Employment.” In International Handbook of Labor Market Policy
and Evaluation, G. Schmid, J. O’Reilly, and K. Schömann, eds. London:
Edward Elgar, pp. 348–378.
Fina, Ll., A. Meixide, and L. Toharia. 1989. “Re-regulating the Labor Market
amid an Economic and Political Transition: Spain.” In The State and the
Labor Market, S. Rosemberg, ed. New York: Plenum Press.
Garrone, G., and C. Villosio. 2001. “Un’Analisi Longitudinale dei Percorsi
Lavorativi e dei Differnziali Retributivi degli Occupati Part-Time.” In Le
Forme del Lavoro, M. Samek Lodovici and R. Semenza, eds. Milano:
Franco Angeli, pp. 181–204.
Güell, M., and B. Petrongolo. 2000. “Workers’ Transitions from Temporary
to Permanent Employment: The Spanish Case.” Centre for Economic Per-
formance working paper DP0438. London: London School of Economics.
Isfol. 1998. “Il Lavoro in Italia: Profili, Percorsi, Politiche.” Unpublished
manuscript.
Istat. 2000. Rapporto Annuale: La Situazione del Paese nel 1999. Roma: Istat.
Jimeno, J.F., and L. Toharia. 1993. “The Effects of Fixed-Term Employment
on Wages: Theory and Evidence from Spain.” Investigaciones Económicas
17(3): 475–494.
Malo, M.A., and L. Toharia. 1999. Costes de Despido y Creación de Empleo.
Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Asuntos Sociales, Colección Estudios.
———. 2000. “The Spanish Experiment: The Pros and Cons of Flexibility at
the Margin.” In Why Deregulate Labor Markets? G. Esping-Andersen and
M. Regini, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 307–335.
Nonstandard Work in Italy and Spain 129
Meldolesi, L. 1998. “L’economia Sommersa nel Mezzogiorno.” Stato e Mer-
cato 53(2): 319–334.
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OCED). 1999.
Employment Outlook—1999. Paris: OECD.
Paci, M. 1998. “Il Dualismo del Lavoro in Italia: La Transizione dalla Rigidità
alla Flessibilità della Regolazione.” Il Mulino 375: 103–111.
Ray, D. 1998. Development Economics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press.
Reyneri, E. 1996. Sociologia del Mercato del Lavoro. Bolonia: Il Mulino.
———. 1998. “Immigrazione ed Economia Sommersa.” In Stato e Mercato
53(2): 287–318.
Rostagno, M.V., and F. Utili. 1998. “The Italian Protection System: The Pov-
erty of Welfare.” IMF working paper 74. Washington, DC: International
Monetary Fund.
Samek Lodovici, M. 2000. “Italy: The Long Times of Consensual Re-regula-
tion.” In Why Deregulate Labor Markets? G. Esping-Andersen and M.
Regini, eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 271–306.
Samek Lodovici, M., and R. Semenza, eds. 2001. Le Forme del Lavoro. Mil-
ano: Franco Angeli.
Semenza, R. 2000. “Le Nuove Forme del Lavoro Indipendente.” Stato e Mer-
cato 58(1): 143–168.
Slichter, Sumner. 1919. The Turnover of Factory Labor. New York: Apple-
ton.
Toharia, L. 1996. “Empleo y Paro en España: Evolución, Situación y Perspec-
tivas.” Ekonomiaz 35: 36–67.
Toharia, L., C. Albert, I. Cebrián, C. Garcia Serrano, I. Garcia Mainar, M.A.
Malo, G.Y. Moreno, and E. Villagómez. 1997. Labor Market Studies—
Spain. Brussels: Commission of the European Communities (updated




in Developed Economies 
 





















W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research 
Kalamazoo, Michigan 
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Nonstandard work in developed economies : causes and consequences /
Susan Houseman and Machiko Osawa, editors.
p. cm.
“These papers were originally presented at a conference sponsored by the
Japan Foundation and the W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
in August 2000”—Introd.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-88099-264-6 (alk. paper) — ISBN 0-88099-263-8 (pbk. : alk.
paper)
1. Hours of labor, Flexible—Developed countries—Congresses. 2. Part
time employment—Developed countries—Cross-cultural
studies—Congresses. 3. Temporary employment—Developed
countries—Cross-cultural studies—Congresses. 4. Employment (Economic






W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, Michigan 49007–4686
The facts presented in this study and the observations and viewpoints expressed are the
sole responsibility of the authors. They do not necessarily represent positions of the
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
Cover design by J.R. Underhill.
Index prepared by Nancy Humphreys.
Printed in the United States of America.
Printed on recycled paper.
Houseman Title Page.fm  Page 4  Monday, November 10, 2003  10:47 AM
